Progress 10/01/08 to 09/30/13
Outputs
Target Audience: Federal and state environmental and natural resource management agencies who have implemented and/or who are in the process of designing price-based environmental policies. Researchers in environmental and natural resource policy making. Changes/Problems:
Nothing Reported
What opportunities for training and professional development has the project provided? The following students have completed MS Thesis or Field Essays under this project. Denny, Matthew. (Field Essay). “Giving too much: The role of beliefs in threshold public goods games.” Faculty Advisor: John Spraggon. 2013 Kelly Miller (Literature Review), “General Deterrence, Audit Uncertainty and Environmental Regulation.” , Faculty Advisor: John M. Spraggon 2013 Gatautis, David J. (Field Essay). ECONOMIC VALUE OF NATIVE BEE POLLINATION TO CONSUMERS: BLUEBERRIES IN THE U.S. Faculty Advisor: Thomas H. Stevens. 2013. Vergara Sobarzo, Lucia Andrea (Thesis). INVESTIGATING THE ABILITY OF PRO-SOCIAL EMOTIONS TO ENHANCE COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR. Faculty Advisor: John Spraggon. 2012 Brassard, Olivia M. (Field Essay). FACTORS INFLUENCING WOOD BIOMASS ENERGY PRODUCTION IN MASSACHUSETTS – A LITERATURE REVIEW AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF MASSACHUSETTS LANDOWNER SURVEY DATA. Faculty Advisor: Thomas H. Stevens. 2011 Magnoni, Scott (Field Essay). CHOICE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS. Faculty Advisor: Thomas H. Stevens. 2011 How have the results been disseminated to communities of interest? The results have been disseminated to the communities of interest through academic journal articles. What do you plan to do during the next reporting period to accomplish the goals?
Nothing Reported
Impacts
What was accomplished under these goals?
As detailed in the earlier sections a significant number of referred journal have been produced and a significant amount of data has been collected. Additionally five MSc students have been supported through this grant. The research has been disseminated to communities of interest through the publication of the academic journal articles.
Publications
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Published
Year Published:
2013
Citation:
Chavez, Carlos A., and John K. Stranlund. 2013. Who Should Bear the Administrative Costs of an ITQ Fishery? Marine Resource Economics 28(3), 243-261.
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Other
Year Published:
2013
Citation:
C. Rojas. 2013. Focal Points and Collusion in the Lab. Working paper.
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Other
Year Published:
2013
Citation:
Spraggon, John M., John Stranlund and Lucia Andrea Vergara Sobarzo, 2013. The role of public revelation to induce cooperation with public goods. In preparation.
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Published
Year Published:
2013
Citation:
Stranlund, John K., and Carlos A. Chavez. 2013. Who Should Bear the Administrative Costs of an Emissions Tax? Journal of Regulatory Economics 44(1), 53-79.
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Under Review
Year Published:
2013
Citation:
Stranlund, John K., 2013. A Note on Correlated Uncertainty and Hybrid Environmental Policies. Under review.
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Under Review
Year Published:
2013
Citation:
Stranlund, John, K., James J. Murphy and John M. Spraggon 2012. Price Controls and Banking in Emissions Trading: An Experimental Evaluation. Under review with Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Other
Year Published:
2013
Citation:
Denny, Matthew, J., Angela C. M. de Oliveira, and John M. Spraggon, 2013. "Beliefs in Threshold Public Goods Games." In preperation.
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Progress 10/01/11 to 09/30/12
Outputs
OUTPUTS: On the theory side of the project two conceptual papers about the efficient design of price-based environmental policies were completed. One deals with the issue of who should pay for enforcement and other administrative costs of emissions taxes. This paper is being revised for resubmission to the Journal of Regulatory Economics. A similar paper deals with the issue of who should pay for the administrative costs associated with a policy of individual transferable quotas in fisheries. This paper is being revised for resubmission to the Marine Resource Economics. On the experimental side of the project, one paper has been submitted, two are in preparation and a new project has been started. A paper was submitted to the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, detailing the results of experiments which were conducted investigating the impact of banking and price controls in a market with uncertainty in the costs of production. A second paper in the markets for tradable permits project is in progress describing the results of experiments which ascertain the efficacy of tying penalties or audit probabilities to the market price of pollution permits. The MSc. Student who is working on the importance of contribution revelation to the level of contributions of public goods has defended her thesis and is in the process of making final changes. This paper will be prepared for publication during 2013. Finally, 3 pilot experiments were completed in the Spring of 2012 for a project titled "Focal Points and Collusion in the Lab. Additional pilot experiments and a grant proposal are planned for Spring 2013. PARTICIPANTS: We have provided training for two MS degree students. TARGET AUDIENCES: Federal and state environmental and natural resource management agencies who have implemented and/or who are in the process of designing price-based environmental and natural resource policies. Researchers in environmental and natural resource policy making. PROJECT MODIFICATIONS: Nothing significant to report during this reporting period.
Impacts
The theoretical work contributes to our knowledge of how to design price-based environmental and natural resource policies, which will be fundamental to our approach to mitigating climate change. The first of the experimental papers is also focused on this issue. The tradable emission permit market project informs various aspects of policy. The banking and price controls paper highlights the tradeoffs in stability between prices and pollution. If price volatility is controlled this leads directly to larger fluctuations in the amount of pollution which is emitted which may be costly if the damages from pollution are convex. The second experiment tradable emission market paper focusses on the optimal control of emission when market prices are uncertain. Initial results suggest that both tying penalties and audit rates to prices reduce non-compliance over a fixed fine and audit rate but tying audit rates to prices reduces noncompliance by significantly more than when fines are tied to prices. The importance of contribution revelation paper suggests that probabilistic monitoring may increase contributions to public goods more efficiently than perfect monitoring. This suggests that the threat of an audit may be more valuable than an actual audit. The main objective of the "Focal Points and Collusion in the Lab" experiments is to explore under what conditions price ceilings can foster collusion among firms. While the empirical literature has found price ceilings to be supportive of collusion, the experimental literature has failed to do so. We argue that these at odds results are due to experimental designs that fail to capture key assumptions of the underlying theory. The results will be very informative for policy makers as they try to understand the market conditions that are more conducive to collusion. All of these results will be very informative for policy makers as they try to understand how to better manage and regulate markets.
Publications
- No publications reported this period
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Progress 10/01/10 to 09/30/11
Outputs
OUTPUTS: On the theory side of the project two conceptual papers about the efficient design of price-based environmental policies were completed. One deals with the issue of who should pay for enforcement and other administrative costs of emissions taxes. This paper is published as a working paper, and will be revised in the near future for submission to a refereed journal. The second paper deals with how enforcement costs affect the design of an emissions market with price controls. This paper is being revised for resubmission to the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. On the experimental side of the project, one paper has been published, another accepted for publication, and three more are in progress. The first is a paper which examines compliance in dynamic laboratory pollution markets was published in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. A second paper investigating the role of information and monitoring on collusion has been accepted at the RAND Journal of Economics. Experiments were conducted for a paper which investigates the impact of banking and price controls in a market with uncertainty in the costs of production. This paper will be written and submitted to a journal in Spring 2012. Data collection has also been completed for a fourth paper investigating the importance of contribution revelation to the level of contributions of public goods. The MSc. Student who is leading this project expects to defend her dissertation at the end of January. PARTICIPANTS: Nothing significant to report during this reporting period. TARGET AUDIENCES: Federal and state environmental and natural resource management agencies who have implemented and/or who are in the process of designing price-based environmental policies. Researchers in environmental and natural resource policy making. PROJECT MODIFICATIONS: Nothing significant to report during this reporting period.
Impacts
The theoretical work contributes to our knowledge of how to design price-based environmental policies, which will be fundamental to our approach to mitigating climate change. The first of the experimental papers is also focused on this issue. The second experiment paper suggests that certain prediction of theories of how firms collude receive more support than others. Specifically, the more cognitively demanding (although mathematically feasible) outcomes are almost never present in the data while the more appealing and intuitive almost always come show up in the results. The third set of experiments suggests that price collars may be a useful regulatory tool for limiting price volatility in emission trading markets. The fourth experimental paper will inform our understanding of how to increase contributions to public goods. All of these results will be very informative for policy makers as they try to understand how to better manage and regulate markets.
Publications
- C. Rojas. 2011. "The Role of Demand Information and Monitoring on Tacit Collusion." RAND Journal of Economics, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014671.
- Stranlund, John K.; James J. Murphy, and John M. Spraggon. 2011. "An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62, 414-429.
- Stranlund, John K., and L. Joe Moffitt. 2011. "Enforcement and Price Controls in Emissions Trading." Revision requested from the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Stranlund, John K., and Carlos A. Chavez. 2010. "Who Should Bear the Administrative Costs of an Emissions Tax" http://people.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers/documents/ResEcWorkingPap er2011-3.pdf
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Progress 10/01/09 to 09/30/10
Outputs
OUTPUTS: On the theory side of the project, two conceptual papers about the efficient design of price-based environmental policies were completed. One deals with whether it is efficient to enforce emissions taxes so that firms are compliant, while the other deals with the issue of who should pay for enforcement and other administrative costs of emissions taxes. The latter paper is under review at a refereed journal. On the experimental side of the project, three papers are in progress. The first is a paper which examines compliance in dynamic laboratory pollution markets was completed and is now under review at a refereed journal. The second investigates the role of information and monitoring on collusion is being disseminated via the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), a web-based system designed for researchers to share their work. The third paper is currently in the data collection phase and the empirical analysis and write-up will be completed in the Spring of 2011. This set of experiments investigates the importance of contribution revelation to the level of contributions of public goods. PARTICIPANTS: We have added Dr. Christian Rojas as faculty personnel. Dr. Rojas will contribute to the Hatch project by conducting a series of studies using the methodology of experimental economics. These studies are aimed at understanding the relationship between market conditions and collusion. We have also provided training for one MS degree students. TARGET AUDIENCES: Federal and state environmental and natural resource management agencies who have implemented and/or who are in the process of designing price-based environmental policies. Researchers in environmental and natural resource policy making. PROJECT MODIFICATIONS: Nothing significant to report during this reporting period.
Impacts
The theoretical work contributes to our knowledge of how to enforce price-based environmental policies, which will be fundamental to our approach to mitigating climate change. The first of the experimental papers is also focused on this issue. The second set of experiments suggests that certain prediction of theories of how firms collude receive more support than others. Specifically, the more cognitively demanding (although mathematically feasible) outcomes are almost never present in the data while the more appealing and intuitive almost always come show up in the results. These results will be very informative for policy makers as they try to understand the market conditions that are more conducive to collusion. The third experimental paper will inform our understanding of how to increase contributions to public goods.
Publications
- C. Rojas. 2010. "The Role of Information and Monitoring on Collusion." Social Science Research Network manuscript.
- Stranlund, John K. 2010. "Should We Impose Emissions Taxes that Firms Evade"
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Progress 10/01/08 to 09/30/09
Outputs
OUTPUTS: On the theory side of the project three conceptual papers about the efficient design of price-based environmental policies were started. These dealt with the safety-valve concept to cap uncertain emission control costs in emission trading programs; the optimal degree of enforcement for emissions taxes, and the issue of who should pay for enforcement and other administrative costs of price-based environmental policies. One of these was submitted to a refereed journal, while the other two are still in progress. In terms of environmental valuation a contingent valuation survey of forest landowners in Southern Vermont and Western Massachusetts was conducted. Two projects have focused on regulation of US fisheries. One project examines the impact on climate change and the corresponding change in viable habitat on the setting of maximum sustainable yield. For this project we are developing the framework to integrate the biological-hydrological models with the socio-economic model of harvesters' decision-making. In the second project we are examining the role of institutions in harvest decisions. We are deriving the theoretical model of profit maximization under various institutional scenarios. PARTICIPANTS: We have added Dr. Angela de Oliveira as faculty personnel. Dr. de Oliveira will contribute to the Hatch project by conducting a series of studies using the methodology of experimental economics. These studies will be aimed at understanding the role that individual heterogeneity plays in the ability of groups to attain socially desirable outcomes (such as improved environmental quality). We have also provided training for two MS degree students. TARGET AUDIENCES: Federal and state environmental and natural resource management agencies who have implemented and/or who are in the process of designing price-based environmental policies. Researchers in environmental and natural resource policy making. PROJECT MODIFICATIONS: Nothing significant to report during this reporting period.
Impacts
Our theoretical results suggest that under certain conditions hybrid trading/tax policies can result in lower emissions than trading policies alone. The results of the contingent value survey suggest that it would cost about $700 per acre to entice about one-half of Massachusetts and 33% of Vermont responders to permanently conserve their forest land. Policies that promote early development of management plans and cooperation with neighbors are recommended because these activities appear to increase the likelihood that landowners will convey conservation easements. Education and a strong environmental ethic also improve the chances that respondents would sell conservation easements. The fisheries research suggests that fishermen may suffer welfare losses under individual transferable quotas if the processing sector in imperfectly competitive and that there is empirical evidence of changes in contracting practices, harvest rates and shares of crew remuneration.
Publications
- Stranlund, John K. 2009. "A Safety Valve for Emissions Trading." University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Department of Resource Economics, Working paper 2009-4.
- Brandt, S. & Ding, N. (2008). Impact of property rights on labor contracts in commercial fisheries. Ocean and Coastal Management, 51(11), 740-748.
- LeVert, M., Stevens, T., & Kittredge, D. (2009). Willingness-to-sell conservation easements: A case study. Journal of Forest Economics, 15(4), 261-275.
- McEvoy, D., Brandt, S., Lavoie, N., & Anders, S. (2009). The effects of ITQ management on fishermen's welfare when the processing sector is imperfectly competitive. Land Economics, 85(3), 470-484.
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