Progress 08/01/08 to 06/30/13
Outputs
Target Audience: Target Audience International trade economists and policymakers Changes/Problems:
Nothing Reported
What opportunities for training and professional development has the project provided? 1) I have presented my work in annual Western Economic Association International in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. 2) I also mentored and supervised two PhD students. Both of these PhD students graduated during this project and found employment in our related field immediately upon their graduation. 3) I also served a committee member for one MS student during the life of this project. How have the results been disseminated to communities of interest? The results of my project have disseminated to targeted audience (i.,e., academic community and policy makers) thought publication in refereed journals and/or in the form of book chapters. What do you plan to do during the next reporting period to accomplish the goals? I started a new UAES project in 2013-14. I expect to be as productive as in 2008-2013 period, averaging about 4 publication per year.
Impacts
What was accomplished under these goals?
Significant results achieved, including major findings: 1) On pollution permits and abatement: We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution and study in a holistic way the environmental policies, whereby government sets up emission caps and sells emission permits at a competitive price which can be viewed as an emission tax. Then, it uses the collected tax revenues to finance public abatement activities. We characterize a steady-state equilibrium and show how it changes with the size of the economy and with a change in natural pollution absorption rate. 2) Technical Progress and Real Wages Once again: We construct a general equilibrium model of trade and show that an economy can experience technological progress and declining real wages provided that it is open to trade and import demand is sufficiently inelastic in both countries. 3) Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China: We consider the potential influence of contributions from interest groups to political rivals in the voting behavior of US legislators on international trade policy issues. Our application addresses the determinants of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China decision, and focuses particular attention on the agriculture/agribusiness lobby. 4) On competition for listings: We construct a model whereby stock exchanges take a new role as an information intermediary, notably absent in their roles. We show that exchanges differentiate themselves at subgame perfect equilibrium and will not race to the top or to the bottom. 5) Buyer and seller concentration in global commodity markets: This paper considers a situation where an oligopsonistic intermediary industry purchases from a small number of supplying countries, the governments of which act strategically in their policy choices both with respect to the intermediaries and any competing suppliers. In the resulting two-stage game, the paper shows that an export subsidy, rather than an export tax, may arise as the optimal intervention. 6) An elementary proposition on technical progress and non-traded goods: We explore the effect of technical progress on the endogenously determined range of non-traded goods by using a Ricardian model with continuum of goods. 7) Monopolistic Competition and North–South Trade: This paper examines the consequences of opening to international trade for a developing economy with open urban unemployment and rural–urban migration, where the urban sector is monopolistically competitive. 8) Does trade liberalization increase global pollution? : In this paper we consider a simple duopoly market in which a home firm and a foreign firm use labor to produce an identical product and supply it to the home market. Firms emit pollution as a by-product of production. We show conditions under which international trade liberalization decreases (increases) the global pollution. 9) Foreign Direct Investment, Non?Traded Goods and Real Wages: Using a three-sector general equilibrium model with non-traded goods, we investigate the impact of foreign direct investment on the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that foreign direct investment increases the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers alike, but widens the gap between the two under plausible conditions. 10) Listings from the emerging economies: An opportunity for reputable stock exchanges: We provide current evidence to show that the numbers of sponsored depositary receipts created and cross-listed have increased by more than two-fold over the last decade and a substantial proportion of this growth came from the emerging and developing economies. We argue that the need for reputable stock exchanges to play the role of an information intermediary. 11) On technical progress and the boundary of non-traded goods: We use a Ricardian model with continuum of goods to study the effect of technical progress on the endogenously determined ranges of non-traded, exported, and imported goods. We show that if technical progress is unbiased (biased toward the goods that a country has more comparative advantage), the range of non-traded goods increases (decreases). 12) Regional Trade Reform under SAFTA and Income Distribution in South Asia: We use a representative household model of South Asia to explore the potential impacts of regional trade liberalization under the auspices of SAFTA on both the distribution of economic gains across the countries of South Asia, and across various groups within South Asia. 13 Market interconnection and wages: We show that wage behavior as well as the skilled–unskilled wage gap depend on elasticity of import demand. Although, our analysis is in the spirit of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, factor intensity plays no role in our results. 14) Capital specificity, imperfect labor mobility and growth in developing economies: We consider a general equilibrium model of an economy distorted by both sector-specific sticky wages and imperfect mobility of labor. We contrast the implications of capital accumulation in the short and long run. 15) Is regionalism viable? A case for global free trade: We assume an imperfectly competitive world with n commodities and address the question of whether or not (regional) trade blocs are viable. To answer this fundamental question, we use a notion of stability and show that regional trade blocs are not viable as they are not stable. 16) Non-traded goods, technical progress and wages: We use a general equilibrium model of trade to show that technical improvement may indeed cause a fall in the wages of unskilled workers. Under some modest conditions, the wages of skilled workers may go down too. 17) Adjustment Costs and Immiserizing Growth in LDCs: Using a general equilibrium model of a small developing economy, the authors demonstrate that the introduction of asymmetric adjustment costs makes the rate of urban employment respond to an exogenous shock in the aggregate capital endowment, raising the possibility of several counter-intuitive immiserizing growth scenarios. 18) Multinational corporations and export quality: We investigate the effects of spillovers on quality of exports emanating from investment in product quality by multinational corporations, operating in less developed countries. By using a duopoly set up, we show that under price competition these spillovers enhance the quality of exports by less developed countries. We also show that this result is valid under quantity competition.
Publications
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Published
Year Published:
2012
Citation:
Gilbert, J. P., Oladi, R. (2012). Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China. Public Choice, 150, 745-769.
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Published
Year Published:
2012
Citation:
Oladi, R., Gilbert, J. P. (2012). Buyer and Seller Concentration in Global Commodity Markets. Review of Development Economics, 16, 359-367.
- Type:
Conference Papers and Presentations
Status:
Other
Year Published:
2010
Citation:
Oladi, R., Western Economic Association International, "Foreign Environmental Aid, Pollution, and Abatement," WEAI, Portland. (July 2010 - Present)
- Type:
Conference Papers and Presentations
Status:
Other
Year Published:
2010
Citation:
Oladi, R., APEC ECONOMICS Seminars, "On Economics of Narcotics Production and Trade," APEC, Logan. (2010 - Present)
|
Progress 01/01/13 to 06/30/13
Outputs
Target Audience: Target Audience International trade economists and policymakers Changes/Problems:
Nothing Reported
What opportunities for training and professional development has the project provided? 1) I have presented my work in annual Western Economic Association International in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. 2) I also mentored and supervised two PhD students. Both of these PhD students graduated during this project and found employment in our related field immediately upon their graduation. 3) I also served a committee member for one MS student during the life of this project. How have the results been disseminated to communities of interest? The results of my project have disseminated to targeted audience (i.,e., academic community and policy makers) thought publication in refereed journals and/or in the form of book chapters. What do you plan to do during the next reporting period to accomplish the goals? I started a new UAES project in 2013-14. I expect to be as productive as in 2008-2013 period, averaging about 4 publication per year.
Impacts
What was accomplished under these goals?
Significant results achieved, including major findings: 1) On pollution permits and abatement: We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution and study in a holistic way the environmental policies, whereby government sets up emission caps and sells emission permits at a competitive price which can be viewed as an emission tax. Then, it uses the collected tax revenues to finance public abatement activities. We characterize a steady-state equilibrium and show how it changes with the size of the economy and with a change in natural pollution absorption rate. 2) Technical Progress and Real Wages Once again: We construct a general equilibrium model of trade and show that an economy can experience technological progress and declining real wages provided that it is open to trade and import demand is sufficiently inelastic in both countries. 3) Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China: We consider the potential influence of contributions from interest groups to political rivals in the voting behavior of US legislators on international trade policy issues. Our application addresses the determinants of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China decision, and focuses particular attention on the agriculture/agribusiness lobby. 4) On competition for listings: We construct a model whereby stock exchanges take a new role as an information intermediary, notably absent in their roles. We show that exchanges differentiate themselves at subgame perfect equilibrium and will not race to the top or to the bottom. 5) Buyer and seller concentration in global commodity markets: This paper considers a situation where an oligopsonistic intermediary industry purchases from a small number of supplying countries, the governments of which act strategically in their policy choices both with respect to the intermediaries and any competing suppliers. In the resulting two-stage game, the paper shows that an export subsidy, rather than an export tax, may arise as the optimal intervention. 6) An elementary proposition on technical progress and non-traded goods: We explore the effect of technical progress on the endogenously determined range of non-traded goods by using a Ricardian model with continuum of goods. 7) Monopolistic Competition and North–South Trade: This paper examines the consequences of opening to international trade for a developing economy with open urban unemployment and rural–urban migration, where the urban sector is monopolistically competitive. 8) Does trade liberalization increase global pollution? : In this paper we consider a simple duopoly market in which a home firm and a foreign firm use labor to produce an identical product and supply it to the home market. Firms emit pollution as a by-product of production. We show conditions under which international trade liberalization decreases (increases) the global pollution. 9) Foreign Direct Investment, Non?Traded Goods and Real Wages: Using a three-sector general equilibrium model with non-traded goods, we investigate the impact of foreign direct investment on the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that foreign direct investment increases the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers alike, but widens the gap between the two under plausible conditions. 10) Listings from the emerging economies: An opportunity for reputable stock exchanges: We provide current evidence to show that the numbers of sponsored depositary receipts created and cross-listed have increased by more than two-fold over the last decade and a substantial proportion of this growth came from the emerging and developing economies. We argue that the need for reputable stock exchanges to play the role of an information intermediary. 11) On technical progress and the boundary of non-traded goods: We use a Ricardian model with continuum of goods to study the effect of technical progress on the endogenously determined ranges of non-traded, exported, and imported goods. We show that if technical progress is unbiased (biased toward the goods that a country has more comparative advantage), the range of non-traded goods increases (decreases). 12) Regional Trade Reform under SAFTA and Income Distribution in South Asia: We use a representative household model of South Asia to explore the potential impacts of regional trade liberalization under the auspices of SAFTA on both the distribution of economic gains across the countries of South Asia, and across various groups within South Asia. 13 Market interconnection and wages: We show that wage behavior as well as the skilled–unskilled wage gap depend on elasticity of import demand. Although, our analysis is in the spirit of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, factor intensity plays no role in our results. 14) Capital specificity, imperfect labor mobility and growth in developing economies: We consider a general equilibrium model of an economy distorted by both sector-specific sticky wages and imperfect mobility of labor. We contrast the implications of capital accumulation in the short and long run. 15) Is regionalism viable? A case for global free trade: We assume an imperfectly competitive world with n commodities and address the question of whether or not (regional) trade blocs are viable. To answer this fundamental question, we use a notion of stability and show that regional trade blocs are not viable as they are not stable. 16) Non-traded goods, technical progress and wages: We use a general equilibrium model of trade to show that technical improvement may indeed cause a fall in the wages of unskilled workers. Under some modest conditions, the wages of skilled workers may go down too. 17) Adjustment Costs and Immiserizing Growth in LDCs: Using a general equilibrium model of a small developing economy, the authors demonstrate that the introduction of asymmetric adjustment costs makes the rate of urban employment respond to an exogenous shock in the aggregate capital endowment, raising the possibility of several counter-intuitive immiserizing growth scenarios. 18) Multinational corporations and export quality: We investigate the effects of spillovers on quality of exports emanating from investment in product quality by multinational corporations, operating in less developed countries. By using a duopoly set up, we show that under price competition these spillovers enhance the quality of exports by less developed countries. We also show that this result is valid under quantity competition.
Publications
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Published
Year Published:
2012
Citation:
Gilbert, J. P., Oladi, R. (2012). Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China. Public Choice, 150, 745-769.
- Type:
Journal Articles
Status:
Published
Year Published:
2012
Citation:
Oladi, R., Gilbert, J. P. (2012). Buyer and Seller Concentration in Global Commodity Markets. Review of Development Economics, 16, 359-367.
- Type:
Conference Papers and Presentations
Status:
Other
Year Published:
2010
Citation:
Oladi, R., Western Economic Association International, "Foreign Environmental Aid, Pollution, and Abatement," WEAI, Portland. (July 2010 - Present)
- Type:
Conference Papers and Presentations
Status:
Other
Year Published:
2010
Citation:
Oladi, R., APEC ECONOMICS Seminars, "On Economics of Narcotics Production and Trade," APEC, Logan. (2010 - Present)
|
Progress 01/01/12 to 12/31/12
Outputs
OUTPUTS: Activities: I have continued writing multiple papers for submission to refereed journals during 2012. Such activities resulted in publication of three articles in highly respected economic journals: Public Choice, Economics Letters and Review of Development Economics. The results of these papers are highlighted bellow: 1) Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China (Public Choice 150, 2012, 745-769): We consider the potential influence of contributions from interest groups to political rivals in the voting behavior of US legislators on international trade policy issues. Our application addresses the determinants of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China decision, and focuses particular attention on the agriculture/agribusiness lobby. A simultaneous voting-net contributions model suggests that these contributions were very effective relative to organized labor and other corporate groups, despite their relatively small dollar value. Possible explanations arising from differences in targeting strategies are explored. 2) Buyer and Seller Concentration in Global Commodity Markets (Review of Development Economics 16, 2012, 359-367): In recent years there has been an increased incidence of export restrictions applied by developing countries to commodities and raw materials. Commodity markets may be characterized by concentration on the buyer side, with a small number of transnational intermediary firms purchasing from supplying countries and distributing to the market, and recent work has suggested that export taxes may be an optimal policy to recapture monopsony rent. However, in many commodity markets there are also a limited number of large supplying countries. This paper considers a situation where an oligopsonistic intermediary industry purchases from a small number of supplying countries, the governments of which act strategically in their policy choices both with respect to the intermediaries and any competing suppliers. In the resulting two-stage game, the paper shows that an export subsidy, rather than an export tax, may arise as the optimal intervention. 3) On Competition for Listings (Economics Letters 114, 2012, 315-318): We construct a model whereby stock exchanges take a new role as an information intermediary, notably absent in their roles. We show that exchanges differentiate themselves at subgame perfect equilibrium and will not race to the top or to the bottom. Services: I served as the chair for one PhD student and as a committee member on three other PhD committees. I also served as a member of promotion and tenure committee for three faculty members of our department who have active AES projects. Events: I participated in Western Economic Association International meetings in San Francisco in summer of 2012 and presented one of AES paper, titled "Technology Diffusion and Trade Liberalization" I also gave a talk in University of California Riverside, presenting the above mentioned paper. PARTICIPANTS: John Gilbert (USU), Hamid Beladi (University of Texas-San Antonio), Nicholas Tay (University of San Francisco) TARGET AUDIENCES: Academia and policy makers PROJECT MODIFICATIONS: Nothing significant to report during this reporting period.
Impacts
All the articles that I published in 2012 enhance our fundamental knowledge of particular economic problems we addressed in these papers. Therefore, these publications offer significant contributions to economic literature and insights to policy makers. I highlighted my findings separately for each of these refereed publications in Outputs.
Publications
- Oladi, R., & Gilbert, J. P., (2012). Buyer and Seller Concentration in Global Commodity Markets: Review of Development Economics, 16: 359-367. (Published).
- Gilbert, J. P., & Oladi, R., (2012). Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Vot
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Progress 01/01/11 to 12/31/11
Outputs
OUTPUTS: Activities: I have written multiple refereed articles and submitted them to various refereed journals for publication. My article submission resulted in 6 refereed journal publications in respected journals such as Journal of Mathematical Economics, Resource and Energy Economics, Review of International Economics, Pacific Economic Review, Journal of Economics Education, and International Review of Economics and Finance. I also coordinated Economics Seminars during the spring semester of 2011. These research seminars integrated into our department research and graduate teaching, and thus directly related to our AES departmental obligations. Services: I served as the chair for two PhD students and as a committee member two PhD students and one student in IMBA program for his Royal Agriculture dissertation. I also served as a member of promotion and tenure committee for three faculty members of our department who have active AES projects. Events: I participated in Western Economic Association International meetings in San Diego in summer of 2011 and presented one of AES paper, titled "On Intra and Inter Industry Trade and Welfare." I also gave a talk in University of California Riverside, presenting another AES paper, titled "On Economics of Narcotics Production and Trade." Products: I developed numerous mathematical models to analyze various issues. Each of the articles that I published in 2011 (see activities) contains a unique mathematical model I developed to study the issue in question. One of PhD student that I served her PhD committee as a co-chair was also graduated in 2011. PARTICIPANTS: John Gilbert (USU) and Hamid Beladi (University of Texas-San Antonio) TARGET AUDIENCES: Academia and policy makers PROJECT MODIFICATIONS: Nothing significant to report during this reporting period.
Impacts
As outcomes of the Project, I have enhanced our knowledge and fundamental understandings about the issues that I studied in various sub-projects. I highlight my findings separately for each subproject (all of them published in refereed journals): An Elementary Proposition on Technical Progress and Non-traded Goods: I explore the effects of technical progress on the endogenously determined range of non-traded goods by using a Ricardian model with continuum of goods. I show that the range of non-traded goods decreases if technical progress is unbiased or if it is biased toward the goods that a country has more comparative advantage. Monopolistic Competition and North-South Trade: It studies the consequences of opening to international trade for a developing economy with open urban unemployment and rural-urban migration. I show that opening to intra-industry trade with a high-wage economy (i.e., North-South trade) will reduce the rate of urban unemployment by a greater amount than intra-industry trade with a similar economy, and that trade intervention in the South may lower welfare by reducing varieties produced in the North. Does Trade Liberalization Increase Global Pollution We show the conditions under which international trade liberalization decreases (increases) the global pollution. Trade liberalization has two effects on global pollution. On the one hand, global output increases which leads to an increase in pollution. We term this the output effect of liberalization on pollution. On the other hand, cleanness (of technology) differential also changes the global pollution due to cross-country output substitution. The technology effect of liberalization on pollution will be positive (thus re-enforces the output effect) if the home firm's technology is cleaner, while such an effect will be negative (therefore opposes the output effect) if the foreign firm's technology is cleaner. Overall, the global pollution falls as a result liberalization if and only if the technology effect outweighs the output effect. This is the condition of our main result. Foreign Direct Investment, Non-traded Goods and Real Wages: Using a three-sector general equilibrium model with non-traded goods, we investigate the impact of foreign direct investment on the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that foreign direct investment increases the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers alike, but widens the gap between the two under plausible conditions. Excel Models for International Trade Theory and Policy: An Online Resource: It provides a resource for instructors of international trade wishing to incorporate Excel-based numerical simulations into the classroom. It brings together a number of simulation models dealing with key aspects of international trade theory and policy. Areas covered include specific factors, factor proportions, general equilibrium analysis of trade and industrial policy, trade disputes, and preferential trading agreements.
Publications
- UTAO+048 Beladi, H., & Oladi, R., (2011). Does Trade Increase Global Pollution: Resource and Energy Economics, 33: 172-178. (Published).
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Progress 01/01/10 to 12/31/10
Outputs
OUTPUTS: The outputs of the project are five academic articles, one of which has been accepted for publication by a respected refereed journal. Other four articles have been submitted to various refereed journals. Accepted Paper: "Does Trade Liberalization Increase Global Pollution" Resource and Energy Economics, forthcoming. PARTICIPANTS: 1) Pollution Permits, Abatement, and International Trade, with Lu Liu (USU APEC PhD student); 2) Does Trade Liberalization Increase Global Pollution with Hamid Beladi (University of Texas); 3) Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China, with John Gibert (USU Econ & FIn faculty); 4) Foreign Aid, Pollution, and Abatement, with Hamid Beladi (University of Texas); 5) On the Economics of Narcotics Production and Trade, with John Gilbert (USU Econ & Fin faculty). TARGET AUDIENCES: Academia as well as policy makers. PROJECT MODIFICATIONS: Nothing significant to report during this reporting period.
Impacts
The summary of outcomes of my AES Projects highlighted as the results of the following sub-projects: 1) Pollution Permits, Abatement, and International Trade: With free trade the government employs an optimal two-dimensional policy. On the one hand, the government issues pollution permits and therefore controls the emission level. On the other hand, it undertakes a positive level of abatement activities. In contrast, the government is inactive for the latter dimension of the policy at the unique steady-state autarky equilibrium. 2) Does Trade Liberalization Increase Global Pollution We show the conditions under which international trade liberalization decreases (increases) the global pollution. Trade liberalization has two effects on global pollution. On the one hand, global output increases which leads to an increase in pollution. We term this the output effect of liberalization on pollution. On the other hand, cleanness (of technology) differential also changes the global pollution due to cross-country output substitution. We simply term this technology (substitution) effect of liberalization. It should be noted that these are new notions that we introduce to the literature. The technology effect of liberalization on pollution will be positive (thus re-enforces the output effect) if the home firm's technology is cleaner, while such an effect will be negative (therefore opposes the output effect) if the foreign firm's technology is cleaner. Overall, the global pollution falls as a result liberalization if and only if the technology effect outweighs the output effect. This is the condition of our main result. 3) Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China: Our application addresses the determinants of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China decision, and focuses particular attention on the agriculture/agribusiness lobby. A simultaneous voting-net contributions model suggests that these contributions were very effective relative to organized labor and other corporate groups, despite their relatively small dollar value. Possible explanations arising from differences in targeting strategies are explored. 4) Foreign Aid, Pollution, and Abatement: This paper provides a Ricardian general equilibrium model to study the effect of foreign aid aimed to abate pollution in a small southern recipient economy. We show that such type of aid reduces pollution but increases emission in the absence of trade. With trade, aid reduces both pollution and emission given that the recipient country has comparative advantage in dirty good. Moreover, such type of aid can be immiserizing. 5) On the Economics of Narcotics Production and Trade: We show that foreign aid to enforcement activities could lower welfare in the recipient economy under plausible conditions, and that paradoxically, countries that are more successful in their anti-narcotics activities are more likely to be harmed by further aid to enforcement.
Publications
- No publications reported this period
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Progress 01/01/09 to 12/31/09
Outputs
OUTPUTS: I believe 2009 was a productive year for me; I studied a number of issues under my experiment station project. The outputs of these studies resulted in three research articles that will be mentioned in the outcome section of this report. PARTICIPANTS: John Gilbert; USU PhD Student TARGET AUDIENCES: Academia as well as policy makers. PROJECT MODIFICATIONS: Nothing significant to report during this reporting period.
Impacts
I highlight the outcomes of the above studies in what follows. 1) Global Commodity Market Concentration (with J. Gilbert): Among the major disagreements that have lead to the break-down of trade negotiations under Doha Round is the issue of agricultural subsidies. The main theme of this research is to study the plausible global market conditions under which exporters of agricultural commodities, such as wheat, issue subsidies. Commodity markets, such as wheat and coffee, may be characterized by concentration on the buyer side. In many cases, developing economies may have little choice but to sell through these intermediaries, and recent work has suggested the export taxes may be an optimal policy to recapture some of the monopsony rent. However, in many commodity markets there are a limited number of large supplying countries. Even if the markets are competitive, this supply-side concentration suggests that economies have market power themselves, and that the governments of the countries may be engaged in a strategic game when selecting trade policies. We consider a situation where an oligopsonistic intermediary industry purchases from a small number of supplying countries, the governments of which act strategically in their policy choices both with respect to the intermediaries and any competing suppliers. In the resulting two-stage game, we show that an export subsidy may arise as the optimal intervention. 2) Pollution Permits, Abatement, and International Trade: One of the issues that often raised by activists and policy makers at sideline of trade negotiations is the issue of environmental degradation. It is often argued by some activists and policy makers that international trade can degrade the environment. Thus, it is argued, free trade must be coupled with environmental protection policies. In this research (co-authored with a USU PhD student), we studied the optimal pollution emission and abatement policies comprehensively for a small economy. We present a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution, emission permit, abatement, and international trade. With free trade the government employs a two-dimensional policy. On the one hand, the government issues pollution permits and therefore controls the emission level. On the other hand, it undertakes a positive level of abatement activities. In contrast, the government is inactive for the latter dimension of the policy under the autarky equilibrium. 3) Excel Models for International Trade Theory and Policy: An Online Resource. This pedagogical research is useful in teaching various concepts in trade theory. International trade theory, with its emphasis on general equilibrium and its myriad of intricate geometric expositions, is particularly well-suited to Excel-based modeling. Areas covered include specific factors, factor proportions, general equilibrium analysis of trade and industrial policy, trade disputes, and preferential trading agreements. Impacts: The results of these papers are useful for policy makers. They also contribute to their related literature. They provide insights with regard to these very important and timely issues.
Publications
- Liu, L. and Oladi, R. 2009. Pollution, Abatement, and International Trade. ERI 2009-03.
- Oladi, R. and Gilbert, J. 2009. Buyer and Seller Concentration in Global Commodity Markets. ERI 2009-06.
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